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Three "Globalizations" in Different Forms: are They in Conflict with Each Other?

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Abstract: As paradoxical as it may seem, there is no longer a single globalization but three. In the 1970s, this international economic system, known as "globalization", was imposed in the world. It is the globalization we have lived with for fifty years, and it is a globalization at Western standards. The choice and promotion come from the United States, which had every reason to believe that they might lose their dominant position in the world, and that Japan or Europe will take their place. Obviously, it is impossible to know, now that this globalization seems to be on the decline, whether, without it, Europe or Japan would have finally dislodged the United States of their dominant position. This international system , emerging as new when it was not, has been accepted from one end of the world to the other, with great enthusiasm. And the reason for this enthusiasm was that it promised the end of crises, the increase of the prosperity, the insurance of benefits to the whole of the exchanges, but also the possibility for all the inhabitants of the Earth to improve their situation, thanks to new technologies. The negative consequences of globalization, which failed in all its initial promises, have afterwards made skeptics right.

Keywords: *globalization; liberalization; protectionism; conflict.*

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1. Introduction

Since there are only two cosmo-theories, that of trade liberalization and that of protectionism, they are applied alternately, and moreover, for more or less equal periods [4]. According to François Lenglet [4], there is a recurring cycle over a period of about 80 years, which includes two half-cycles of around forty years each: protectionism and the liberalization of international trade. Since the introduction of the last globalization, fifty years have passed, that is to say more than what is planned [4] for its replacement by a protectionist regime. The three paragraphs of this article will deal with the three different types of globalization. The first that has dominated the planet for fifty years, is a globalization governed by Western standards and is already on the decline, yielding an increasingly large part of its operation to protectionism. The second, known as being digital or complementary, exists at the same time as the first. Finally, the third, which interferes under the colors of China and should dominate from here to 5 or 7 years.

2. Theoretical Background

The fact that signs of a decline in Western-style globalization are being taken into account argues for the assumption that the planet is about to move to the other system, namely protectionism or at least a combination of both systems, with a fairly large share of protectionism.

It is interesting, in relation to these two existing international economic systems, to know which of them, by their history, shows the best results for the economy, but also for the citizens of the country that adopts them.

Despite the fact that protectionism is presented by all the elites of the planet as a system suitable for the weak, those who do not support competitiveness and are more or less considered to have limited capabilities, it turns out that it has been in place longer, compared to its equivalent, that of trade liberalization, but also that it has a positive effect on growth. The protectionist system, however, is frightening and provoking hysteria, while its disadvantages are often exaggerated. This approach to protectionism can be attributed to the fact that over the past 100 years, the liberalization, especially of financial exchanges, has largely favored multinationals and bankers, who react in this way because they do not want to lose their privileges [4]. The following observations by Lawrence Summers on the fanatics of open borders are particularly [8] enlightening: "It is an elitism without country subjected to economic globalization and individual prosperity, not to the interests of the nation where they live".

It is not certain, however, that protectionism, which could be seen as the West's response to the end of globalization, will ultimately be the successor system. And this, because China and its escort is invading the international scene, bringing not only a simple globalization to completely new standards, but also a culture diametrically different from that of the West. It is the rebirth of the "Silk Road" *which is methodically and meticulously prepared and whose arrival will change everything in the daily life of the inhabitants of planet Earth. So I foresee that protectionism, whose presence is already being felt in the world, will not be clearly the new international economic order that will succeed Western globalization, but simply a "fraction" that will exist, without dominating, at the same time as globalization to Chinese standards.*

The American leader, and not only him, is now using protectionism as an alternative system of Western globalization to save the West, starting naturally with his own country, the United States. And the absence of ideology of those opposing globalization is already covered by the research for lost identity: that of the Nation, of religion, of the essential values of life, of culture. On the other hand, the peoples of America to Egypt are disappointed by globalization, while the positive results of globalization are unevenly distributed and accumulated at the top. The non-fulfillment of the initial promises of globalization, as well as the explosion of inequalities have provoked for the majority, in Europe especially but also in America, a wave of anger.

In the context of globalization, preferences turn against the expansive monetary and economic policy and, consequently, against the population, even when its pace is very low, and on the contrary, in favor of austere monetary stability, able to make sure the flow of capital from one end of the Earth to the other is safe. The protectionist system, on the other hand, works in concert with the presence of state and welfare state interventionism, with measures to reduce inequalities, and with the strengthening of the middle class. A certain degree of controlled inflation, which helps to repay the debts or controlled imbalances in the various balances is, in principle, tolerated.

As for de-globalization, what definition suits better? Frédéric Lordon [5] considers the many features to be radically opposite to those of globalization, to the extent that de-globalization is obviously seen as a blessing. Therefore here is the definition of globalization: "Competition between economies with abysmally different wage standards. The permanent threat of relocation. The shareholder constraint demanding unlimited financial returns". And the negative definition of globalization, which is at the same time a positive definition of de-globalization, according to Frédéric Lordon [5] is as follows: "reduce the flow of goods and capital, and relocate productive systems (...), stop competition between workers and peasants of the world, valuing the diversity of knowledge and social practices, feeding populations and ensuring food sovereignty". Walden Bello [3] also tries to define the de-globalization, as follows: "It is a question of redirecting the economies, from the priority to the production for the export, to the production destined to the local markets".

We must insist on the fact that it is very difficult to draw a general conclusion about the greater effectiveness and relevance of each of the two available systems: free trade and protectionism. And this because, firstly, their implementation is too rarely absolute to exclude their combination, and secondly, precisely because the results are a function of their combination.

Signs of globalization fatigue are already being observed, and often dramatically, in many sectors. First, the financial exchanges, which have put their seal on the globalization, are decreasing. Before the crisis, they amounted to $ 206 billion or 355% of global GDP and have already subsided by about 50 units in world GDP. International capital flows have also declined vertically, estimated at around 70%, compared to the beginning of the crisis. For their part, the banks rushed to reduce international loans by $ 3 billion, compared to what existed before the onset of the crisis. Encouraging the return of trade within borders could be interpreted as a search by banks for more security. This trend has, in any case, been reinforced by the crisis, but not exclusively. At the same time, many economies are returning to controls on the movement of capital. Thus, the global capital flow, which since 2007 reached 11 billion dollars, did not exceed one third of this amount in 2012 [3]. More specifically, it is estimated that for the European Union, by mid-2013, its financial completion would reach its 1999 level, that is, before the adoption of the single European currency [4]. The strong downward trend in financial trade also concerns foreign direct investment, which is declining after the crisis. Foreign direct investment in enterprises is estimated[1] to have declined by an additional 15% in 2012. In this sector, there is an increasing reluctance to sell public wealth from all national economies. Another sign of stability is that of international trade, which since 2012 has been around 2% compared to 8.5% for the period 2002-2007. This slowdown in international trade follows that of international economic activity whose pace, since 2011, is only 3.4% compared to 5% before. At constant prices, changes in international trade are inferior for the first time since 1950, to those in world GDP [1]. The

[1] McKinsey consulting firm

income elasticity of trade was 2 in 1990 while now it is only 1 [9]. *Now that Western-style traditional globalization is declining, one cannot help noticing, with some irony, that it was America that imposed it some fifty years ago, and that it is still America that is now turning against it*. This reaction seems to have been caused by Donald Trump's dissatisfaction with the uncontrolled liberalization of international trade, which is explained by the fact that 77% of the US trade deficit comes from commercial transactions with WTO countries (World Trade Organization). Moreover, it is true that the average level of US taxes up to now was much lower than that of other countries [12] with which the United States trades.

3. Argument of the paper

The void caused by the decline of traditional globalization is being filled, at least in part, by a different globalization that knows no borders. Indeed, although trade of goods seems tired, as shown above, the digital exchange of services is exploding. Often incorporated into goods, services are largely underestimated by international trade statistics. According to the OECD, the analysis of the value added of traded goods shows that the share of services in world trade in goods and services was 64% in 2016 and not 23% [10]. But these figures do not capture the spectacular rise of digital globalization, because it blurs the boundaries between goods and services, and does not rely directly on market goods, as shown by the example of Google, taken again massively by digital *start-ups*. Thus, international data flows have been multiplied by 45 since 2005 (+ 50% per year), reaching 400 000 gigabits per second at the end of 2016. According to a study by the McKinsey Global Institute, the contribution of these flows to global GDP growth would already be more significant than world trade in goods. These flows are mostly composed of information, research, communications, transactions, videos, and data transfers between firms. Thus they propagate ideas and innovations, and upset the nature and dynamics of globalization that gives an essential role to digital platforms, such as Amazon or eBay.

These platforms connect buyers and sellers from five continents. In 2016, the amount of goods and services sold on Amazon and Alibaba represented $ 700 billion (a fourfold increase in five years). Since 2005, the number of online sales has multiplied by 10 and it is estimated that this figure is expected to increase to 100 billion Euros in 2019[2]. Online consumers spent on average 2200 Euros for 33 exchanges in 2017, while in 2007 they spent less than 800 Euros. 59% of online shoppers made

[2] According to the forecast of Fevad.

purchases from European countries, at least once in two, but also from China, for 1/4 of their purchases [6]. If all countries had an active share in e-commerce, it is estimated that world GDP would increase by 13%.

However, I must point out that digital globalization, even if it gives the impression of functioning democratically, is in fact very different [14].

Indeed, even if the internet offers, in theory, an infinite number of choices to consumers, the winners, at the end of the day, who reap huge sums and notoriety, are very few. And this is because technology is driving consumers/viewers to what is expected to be the most attractive, leaving the least demanded, the "left behind". For example, Netflix, which offers hundreds of DVDs of motion pictures and videos, always leaves very short time for popular movies, while all the others are put away. Of the thousands of cinematographic works from around the world in 2016, of which 700 were American, the top five were Walt Disney productions. The same image is given by BuzzAngle Music for which, in 2016, the demand for the 1000 songs that became famous accounted for 23% of total demand. In 2007, in the United States, of the 3.9 million pieces of music, only 36 accounted for 7% of all sales. People want to see, listen, acquire what most people want to have. Although all online participants are free to choose from a variety of products and services, the lack of unlimited time limits their preferences, which, with some exceptions, are reduced to those of others. "The internet world is dominated by the oligarchy of giant platforms, like Facebook, Google, Amazon, Netflix, Disney, Alibaba and Tencent, and the rich get richer." The result is, as Chris Anderson points out in his 2016 book *The Long Tail*, that in fact, in mass entertainment the problem is not if one will "sell a few units of a large amount of products" but if we are going to sell "a lot more than a small amount".

The disproportionate power that these giant internet companies, such as Facebook, Google and Amazon, have acquired in the West has begun to raise awareness of the dangers attached and to seek ways to limit them. The main problems with their enormous power come from the fact that competitiveness is in fact suppressed, because of the systematic acquisition of competitors, but also because the concentration of an unlimited number of personal information makes possible to follow all aspects of the privacy of citizens, and in the field of the economy, identify the conditions of online purchase, posing the serious question of the functioning of democracy. I would also like to mention the recent scandal related to Facebook, which has been proven to affect the sale of personal data of 87 million users. All governments have begun to oppose the uncontrolled power of internet giants, especially after the $ 2.7 billion fine that the European Commission gave to Google in 2017.

The problem, as I analyze it in many places in this study, is the difficulty of measuring the productivity of services in general, and more specifically of these digital businesses, since these measurement tools are not traditional tools, and not in the absence of measuring tools.

Digital globalization, despite the few difficulties that it reveals, should survive all new situations and international reversals, and will continue to amplify its scope.

4. Arguments to support the thesis

Therefore, now, that traditional globalization seems to be sidelined, another globalization is emerging, with new forms, and is aggressively invading the international scene, taking everything in its path. It is the Chinese [7] globalization, which was announced by Xi Jinping in 2013 as "a belt, a road", and which has the ambition to "draw the world" around a new international economic order whose core will be China. This is the great project of the charismatic Chinese president, Xi Jinping, whom he himself calls the "new Marshall Plan", but in a more daring version than the initial one [15].

Before going further into the stakes of this "new Silk Road" that should upset the international economic scene, it seems interesting to examine how the Chinese President sees globalization, if it is simply defined as free movement of goods, services and factors of production. On the side of Chinese communist politics, Xi Jinping's enthusiasm for globalization seems a priori curious, as we saw in Davos in 2017: "Protectionism is like being alone in the dark." This statement ceases to be curious and inexplicable if we link it with the phantasmagorical results of growth ensured by globalization to China. Without globalization, China would still be a poor, marginal country, not just China, but other emerging economies as well.

Nevertheless, Xi Jinping's position in the face of globalization, despite his enthusiastic statements, is far from clear. Also in Davos, he says that "it will be necessary to redefine globalization ...", to which is added a series of actions, one can deduce that China seeks to establish a globalization with specific forms, which naturally will go in his favor. More precisely, since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, capital export controls, criticisms of the West's convictions and Internet censorship have intensified. In addition, 80% of US companies believe that China is less and less willing to accept foreign companies on its territory [11]. *The globalization applied by China is combined with protectionism, as its capitalism is combined with communism*. The implementation in this form of globalization integrates China into the current system of international trade but, at the same time, another globalization advances, and it is original, completely Chinese and aimed at bringing about devastating changes in the world economy. This is, as has been reported above, the already applied decision of China to revive the "Silk Road".

The "Silk Road" was, 2000 years ago, the main commercial axis connecting the West with the East. It is by this road that Genghis Khan arrived in Europe, and it is by this route that Alexander the Great has almost reached China. The fusion of these two great civilizations, Greek and Eastern, has given an extraordinary impulse to the sciences, the arts and philosophy. The penetration of Alexander the Great in the East, by the Silk Road, allowed the creation of new cities, many of which have his name, and spread Greek culture and Greek thought in the most distant regions. The link, therefore, between China and Greece dates back centuries, through the first silk route. It is revived with the "new Silk Road", and with the port of Piraeus that China has chosen as a gate to bring its products to Europe, which will circulate through the Greek merchant fleet [2].

5. Arguments to argue the thesis

Economic growth had made prohibitive the cost of moving products on the "Silk Road" that had been abandoned for centuries. But again, new technologies have reapplied the economic opportunity to exploit this route, as rail traffic has become fast and affordable.

The information about the unbridled preparations for this new and original globalization, planned and carried out by China, although reported discreetly and without fanfare, certainly deals with the most important event, since its long-term effects term will change the face of the world. It is a globalization with a completely different philosophy, which wipes out all of its previous forms. With a budget of several billion dollars, China aims to revive the "Silk Road", implementing huge infrastructure works in Laos, Pakistan, Kenya, Europe. China is planning to draw railway lines that will start in Budapest, Serbia and will thus provide an additional artery in order to spread its products in Europe. The port of Piraeus, bought by China, will be his stepping stone to Europe. The "One Belt, One Road" project, promoted by Chinese President Xi Jinping, plans to build infrastructure in Asia, Africa and Europe, and improve the quality of life for people in more than 60 countries around the world. *The objective of this major project is to promote, as much as possible, the strategic advantage of each participating country.*

Specifically, Chinese engineers build hundreds of tunnels and bridges in the Laos jungle that will support the rails of the 414-kilometer long railway. This project plans to connect six Asian countries and the estimated cost is $ 6 billion. China is also building power plants in Pakistan to provide power to areas that do not have power. These investments are estimated at $ 46 billion. In Kenya, China is modernizing the railway line connecting the port of Mombasa to Nairobi to facilitate access to Chinese products. The railway line was commissioned in the summer of 2017 and will be serviced for several years by China. Major infrastructure projects are planned or started in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Tanzania, etc. Funded by China, the construction of the railway line is planned, from Budapest to Belgrade, to ensure a new artery to distribute Chinese products in Europe, through the port of Piraeus. By mutual agreement and with others, colossal investments in infrastructure projects, in progress or planned in the future, on the three continents, Asia, Africa and Europe, China is building its world empire, its own globalization. The important needs of many countries that have joined the "new silk route" are reaching $ 1.7 billion a year. It is expected that the completion of this project will employ 100,000 Chinese.

The construction, even with losses, of infrastructure projects around the world, of an inconceivable scale, imaginatively links the problem of the overabundance of Chinese products due to the slowdown in its growth rate, such as steel, aluminum, cement and machinery, with China's global domination. Let us add that the use of coal was stopped in China, but not the production. Coal is sent in Kenya where, at the expense of China, power plants are built to meet the growing demand for electricity in the country [13]. These products, like many others, can no longer be absorbed by China whose growth rate is slowing. The Chinese president draws a parallel between the "globalization 2.0" plan and the Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild Europe after the war, and through which America made allies in Europe and was able to to establish itself as the world's leading power.

For the moment, China, for its part, guarantees that its globalization will not base its power on strategic alliances, nor on a content similar to the new order of things of the American president, whose motto is "America first", based on protectionism. China, on the other hand, is going to erect a new globalization aimed on the long term and not the short term, based on public investments, all over the world. Although Australia has refused to integrate this plan, China's size and perspectives are such that everyone will strive to maintain the best relationship with it.

6. Dismantling the arguments against

Despite reciprocal compliments from America and China, there is no doubt that the success of Chinese globalization will mean the end of US domination. Therefore, it seems clear that America does not look favorably on China's domineering aims, and the question is, what is it doing or what should it do to stop it? The United States, for their part, are engaged in a protectionist regime, in the field of international trade, which harms the economies they mostly trade with, particularly if these exchanges result in the formation of a deficit of trade balance at the expense of America.

Consequently, America, aiming to avoid a trade deficit, withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which also included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. Beyond the justified doubts that, in the case of America, protectionism is preferable to tolerating a deficit of the trade balance with certain countries, it is certain that, with these decisions, America leaves a void which the emerging China, as the world's leading power, is quick to fill. Thus, the opinion that America's choices, instead of preventing or slowing China's global triumph, accelerates it, seems to be justified [16]. It is reasonable to expect that all Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) countries, rightfully disturbed by the fact they have been abandoned by America, will be happy to approach China and to join its ambitious project to dominate the world[3]. America is certainly worried by China's obvious expansionist tendencies, which ultimately affect the entire planet. US concerns about China's rapid rise in all areas, including new technologies, have recently led to new measures to protect their sovereignty. More specifically, under the general pretext of their national security, the United States is increasingly refusing, on a more general scale, to authorize the acquisition of American companies by China. In imposing these new restrictions, America is striving to protect by all means its own new technology. The US government thus expresses strong suspicions about specific cases where the acquisition of companies by foreign investors, more precisely Chinese, aimed to access new technologies. It is precisely this trend that America seeks to avoid.

However, America's concern can not be justified by the mere surge of China on the entire planet, because the European Union, in turn, rightly feels threatened. And this, because the Chinese are already getting closer to eleven EU Member States and five Balkan [17] countries that cooperate and

[3] There are, of course, some exceptions, such as Australia's refusal to sign China's plan, and India's hesitation because some of the routes China wants to open are going through Kashmir, Pakistan-claimed region.

are funded by China. These countries are: Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, ARYM, Montenegro, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Reactions against China from countries and sources allied to the EU argued that "China is seeking to infiltrate the EU and to break up its cohesion".

Although China has assured that it has no such aims and that, on the contrary, it seeks to conclude multilateral trade agreements, which would benefit all, we cannot help but asking, with some irony difficult to avoid, of what "European cohesion" are these accusations against China speaking of. Of the BREXIT, with Britain who has officially declared "we do not want this Europe"? Of Catalonia whose freedom of speech is stifled by terrifying threats and programmed manipulations? Of Hungary, which has repeatedly chosen to do what is in its interest from a national point of view and does not correspond to what was imposed on it by the European Union? Of the rise in Europe of so-called "populist" parties that do not want to hear about the EU? Or, finally, without stretching too far, of Greece, for the rescue of which (and to a greater extent of all the south of Europe), no solution has been found, in eight years, except for that of its destruction?

7. Conclusions

The European Union is working on checks to see whether China's investments on European soil are viable and whether European rules are respected regarding the obligation of tender. And while the European Union is worried about bureaucratic details, China has already invested in Europe since 2012, $ 15 billion and for the next few years, it plans additional investments of up to $ 10 billion [20]. For 2016 in particular, year when public investment in Europe had reached their lowest level in twenty years, investments of China amounted to E35 billion, showing a sharp rise of 77% compared to 2015 [2].

In conclusion, one might expect that the West's efforts to contain China's invasion and rise to the top of the international economy are long overdue and are likely to be ineffective.

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