Tolerance as Core Value and Communication Principle

Elina MINNULLINA; Zhanna VAVILOVA

doi:10.18662/lumproc.rsacvp2017.48

Elina MINNULLINA Kazan State Power Engineering University, Kazan, Russia
Zhanna VAVILOVA Kazan State Power Engineering University, Kazan, Russia

DOI: https://doi.org/10.18662/lumproc.rsacvp2017.48

Keywords: rational tolerance, justice, communicative action, dialogue, moral principle

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to study the phenomenon of tolerance as an ethical and communication principle. There are some risks of appealing to tolerance. It can be argued that moral relativism does not allow for justification of norms of tolerance. One of the consequences of taking tolerance as the fundamental principle of interactions is that it can turn into a cultural separatism that alienates people. In total accord with the idea that relativistic tolerance makes criticism impossible, we would like to further develop the concept of tolerance and to consider a different angle. Relativistic interpretation of this notion leads to an ambiguous position, when tolerance does not lead to stabilizing relationships, but conditions separation between people, arbitrariness, and permissiveness, including admissibility of social injustice. We could call such kind of behavior a «seeming tolerance» that is replacing in reality the concepts of indifference and passive concession.

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